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HOW BELIEF-CREDENCE DUALISM EXPLAINS AWAY
PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
By Elizabeth Jackson
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is
reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic
rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a
unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and
what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I
show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal
is that in high-stake cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not
to rely on one’s belief that p. One should rather rely on one’s credence in p. I conclude that we need
not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that
motivate it.
Keywords: belief, credence, belief-credence dualism, pragmatic encroachment, re-
liance, epistemic rationality.
I. INTRODUCTION
What should we believe? When considering this question, we usually think
of things that are epistemic in nature, like evidence. However, recently, some
have argued that what we should believe is not determined merely by epistemic
factors, like evidence, but also practical factors, like how bad it would be if we
were wrong. This view, often called pragmatic encroachment, is motivated with
cases in which a belief seems perfectly fine when the stakes are low: I believe
this sandwich is made with almond butter and give it to you when you ask for
a snack. However, change only the stakes, and now it seems like I ought to
give up the belief: I find out you are deathly allergic to peanuts, so I should no
longer believe that it is made with almond butter, especially if there is a chance
it is made with peanut butter instead.1
1 Notable defences and discussions of pragmatic encroachment include Hawthorne (2003),
Stanley (2005), Weatherson (2005), Ganson (2008), Fantl &McGrath (2002, 2009), Grimm (2011),
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There is nonetheless something odd about pragmatic encroachment.2 Can
stakes alone really affect the epistemic rationality of belief in this way, without
a change in evidence or any other epistemic factor? In this paper, I offer a
way out for those who are sceptical of pragmatic encroachment.3 I do so by
presenting a picture of themind onwhich there is not one, but two fundamental
doxastic attitudes.On this view, that I call belief-credence dualism,we have not only
beliefs but another doxastic attitude: credences.4 Credences are fine-grained
attitudes, similar to levels of confidence, that are correlated with subjective
probabilities.5 These two attitudes function as complementary epistemic tools,
and our practical situation determines which we ought to rely on in practical
reasoning.
Dualism creates space for the following natural thought. We need not give
up our beliefs just because the stakes are raised; rather, high stakes call for us to
consult our credences instead of our beliefs. Returning to the example above:
when I find out about your peanut allergy, I should consult my credence that
the sandwich is made of almond butter. When I find it to be less than maximal,
it is clear why I ought not give you the sandwich, and instead should gather
more evidence or give you another snack. However, there is no reason to
think that I need to give up my almond-butter belief. This picture of the mind
explains what is going on in the cases commonly used to support pragmatic
encroachment, and vindicates the orthodoxy that justified belief is a function
of merely the epistemic.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, I explain pragmatic
encroachment and the cases that motivate it. In Section III, I explain belief-
credence dualism and some of the major philosophical and psychological
motivations for it. In Section IV, I argue that dualism explains away pragmatic
encroachment—in other words, that dualism offers a unique explanation for
pragmatic encroachment intuitions. Central to my discussion is the distinction
between having a belief and relying on it in reasoning. In Section V, I consider
and address potential objections to my view.
Pace (2011), Schroeder (2012), Weatherson (2012), Ross & Schroeder (2014), Locke (2014, 2017),
Roeber (2018b), and Kim (2017).
2 See Kim (2017: 1, 7).
3 Notable defences and discussions of purism (the denial of pragmatic encroachment) include
Williamson (2002, 2005), Neta (2007, 2012), Nagel (2008, 2010a,b), Fumerton (2010), Reed (2010,
2012), Ichikawa, Jarvis & Rubin (2012), Kim (2016), Zweber (2016), Roeber (2018a), and Anderson
& Hawthorne (2018).
4 Notable defences and discussions of dualism include Pollock (1983, 1994), Adler (2002),
Frankish (2004), Hawthorne (2009), Sosa (2011: ch. 4), Weisberg (2013, forthcoming), Friedman
(2013a), Ross & Schroeder (2014), Buchak (2014), Littlejohn (2015), Carter, Jarvis & Rubin (2016),
and Jackson (2018, forthcoming b, forthcoming c).
5 By ‘credence’ I mean degree of confidence or degree of belief, rather than rational degree
of confidence, like e.g. Lewis (1980). Also, one might prefer to use phrases like ‘partial belief ’
or ‘degrees of belief ’ instead of ‘credence’, but given that some have argued that beliefs do not
come in degrees (Moon 2017), my terminology is more ecumenical.
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II. PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
The pragmatic encroachment debate is about whether practical interests can
affect the epistemic status of particular kinds of mental states—in slogan form,
about whether ‘the practical encroaches on the epistemic’ (Kim 2017). Early
in the debate, many people focused on whether practical factors can affect
knowledge (Hawthorne 2003; Stanley 2005), but lately, many have been focusing
on whether the practical can affect epistemically justified belief (Fantl and Mc-
Grath 2002, 2009; Ganson 2008; Kim 2017: 2; Nagel 2008, 2010a,b; Ross and
Schroeder 2014; Schroeder 2012; Thomason 2007, 2014; Weatherson 2005).
Of course, the practical might affect knowledge by affecting justified belief, so
these foci are not mutually exclusive and are even potentially complementary.
In this paper, I will follow Ross and Schroeder (2014: 260) and focus on the
ways that the practical might affect the epistemic justification or rationality of
belief.6 The phenomenon I will seek to explain away is pragmatic encroachment on
epistemically justified belief.
Proponents of pragmatic encroachment argue that epistemic justification
depends on the practical. One traditional example to motivate pragmatic
encroachment (Stanley 2005: 3–4) is as follows. Suppose that Hannah is driving
home on a Friday afternoon, and plans to stop by the bank to deposit a check.
There is no urgency to deposit this check, and Hannah notices the lines at
the bank are extremely long. She remembers that she was at the bank a few
weeks ago on a Saturday, and thus justifiedly believes that the bank is open
tomorrow.
In the second version of the case, Hannah is also driving home on a Friday
afternoon and plans to deposit a check at the bank. She again sees very long
lines. However, she has very little money in her account and her mortgage
payment is dueMonday. If she doesn’t get the check deposited by that weekend,
she will default on her mortgage and go bankrupt. She has the memory of
being at the bank a few weeks ago on a Saturday, but she also knows her
memory is fallible and banks do change their hours. It seems like Hannah
does not have a justified belief that the bank will be open on Saturday, even
though the epistemic aspects of the case remain the same. Thus, it appears
that stakes alone can affect what one can justifiedly believe.
So-called purists resist this verdict. After all, it seems quite odd that a mere
change in stakes—without a change in evidence, reliability, or any other epis-
temic factor—could change what one is epistemically justified in believing.7
Yet the purist still needs an explanation for cases like the bank cases above.
6 I will not distinguish between epistemic justification and epistemic rationality for the pur-
poses of this paper.
7 As Kim (2017: 7) notes, rejecting purism seems mad! See also Roeber (2018a: 1). Others, such
as Grimm (2011) and Roeber (2018b), make this point about credences but are more sceptical
that we should be purists about belief.
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In what follows, I explain belief-credence dualism and then argue that it can
offer a unique purist explanation for the above cases. My explanation relies
on the distinction between justifiedly having a belief and justifiedly relying on
it in reasoning.
III. BELIEF-CREDENCE DUALISM
III.1. Background
There are at least two kinds of attitudes we have that describe or represent the
world: beliefs and credences.8 Belief is a familiar attitude that is not degreed;
roughly, belief is a propositional attitude one has when one takes something
to be the case or regards it to be true (Schwitzgebel 2015). There are three
belief-like attitudes one can take toward a proposition p; one can believe p,
one can withhold belief with respect to p, and one can disbelieve p.9
Sometimes our attitudes are more complex than simple beliefs; for example,
we might believe p and believe q but be more confident in p than in q.10 This
is one reason why epistemologists appeal to another attitude they call credence.
Credence represents something like the subjective probability of p, often given
a value on the [0, 1] interval. Credences are, in many ways, similar to the more
familiar attitude of confidence.
The way beliefs and credences relate to one another is controversial.11
Some have argued for a credence-first view: that beliefs reduce to credences;12
others have argued for a belief-first view: that credences reduce to beliefs.13
In this paper, my primary target will be proponents of the credence-first view,
who argue that belief is nothing over and above high credence; a common
credence-first view is that belief is credence above some threshold.14
8 Some eliminativists deny this (see Churchland 1981; Jeffrey 1970; Maher 1993: 152–55), but
I set eliminativism aside for the purposes of this paper.
9 Although Friedman (2013b) argues that we suspend on questions, rather than propositions.
10 See Gardenfors (1988) for a discussion of different ways to measure the epistemic strength
of belief.
11 See Jackson (forthcoming a) for an extended discussion of why the relationship between
belief and credence is an important epistemological question.
12 Defences and discussions of credence-first include Foley (1992, 1993: ch. 4, 2009), Hunter
(1996), Bouvens & Hawthorne (1999), Christensen (2004), Weatherson (2005), Douven &
Williamson (2006), Ganson (2008), Sturgeon (2008), Frankish (2009), Chandler (2010), Smith
(2010), Pace (2011), Dallmann (2014), Locke (2014), Pettigrew (2015a,b), Leitgeb (2013, 2014),
Dorst (2017), and Lee (2017a,b).
13 Defences and discussions of belief-first include Harman (1986, 2008), Holton (2008, 2014),
Plantinga (1993: ch. 1), Easwaran (2015), Moon (2018), Kauss (forthcoming), and Jackson &Moon
(MS).
14 Some credence-firsters (e.g. Ganson 2008; Pace 2011; Weatherson 2005) maintain the
threshold for belief is context or stakes dependent. Other credence-first views reduce belief
to some other formal feature of credence, such as Leitgeb’s stability theory (see Leitgeb 2013,
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Dualists maintain that beliefs are not reducible to credences, and credences
are not reducible to beliefs.15 Rather, we have both attitudes and they are
equally fundamental. Most dualists hold this because both attitudes play
unique, indispensable roles in our mental lives. For example, Weisberg (forth-
coming: 8) suggests that ‘our [beliefs and credences] are realized in largely
separate mechanisms. In us, [belief and credence] are largely metaphysically
distinct. . . [we should not treat] either as secondary, in either our psychologi-
cal or our epistemological theorizing.’ Note that dualism is a descriptive claim
about belief and credence. In this paper, I remain neutral about whether there
are normative connections between the two attitudes.
Given dualism, it is plausible to think that one can have both a belief-attitude
in p and a credal-attitude in p simultaneously. As Staffel (2017: 45) notes, this
raises a further question, namely, ‘in which contexts the agent should rely on
her beliefs, and in which contexts she should consult her credences’. I will
explore this in what follows.
III.2. Motivations for dualism
In this section, I explain one of the primary motivations for dualism, which
purports to show that dualism explains features of our mental lives and rea-
soning that a credence-first view cannot. Then, in the following sections, I
will show how the motivation for dualism discussed here explains what is go-
ing on in pragmatic encroachment cases without forcing us to commit to the
pragmatic encroachment thesis.
Because my main opponent in this paper is credence-firsters, who agree
with me that credences are essential for reasoning, I will focus on the crucial
role of belief in reasoning. Dualists have proposed several roles that belief may
play, including the ability to take a stand/have a view of the world (Foley
1993; Kalpan 1996) being indispensable for our practices of praise and blame
(Buchak 2014), and allowing our attitudes to be correct or incorrect (Carter,
Jaris and Rubin 2016; Lee 2017a; Ross and Schroeder 2014: 275–7).
I will focus on a particular role of belief that is pioneered by Ross and
Schroeder (2014: 286), among others.16 The view is summarized nicely by
Staffel (2017: 42): ‘cognitively limited agents like us need outright beliefs, be-
cause they simplify our reasoning. In adopting outright beliefs, an agent takes
the believed claims for granted in her reasoning, which frees her from having
2014). Another possible credence-first view says that belief that p doesn’t reduce to merely one’s
credence in p, but rather reduces to facts about one’s credal state as a whole. Thanks to Lara
Buchak.
15 See footnote 4 for a list of authors who defend dualism.
16 See also Lin (2013), Lin & Kelly (2012), Wedgwood (2008: 4, 2012), Smithies (2012: 278),
Tang (2015), Weatherson (2016), Weisberg (forthcoming), and Staffel (forthcoming).
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to pay attention to small error probabilities.’ In other words, one role of belief
is that it simplifies our reasoning.
In reasoning, we have at least two aims—accuracy and efficiency. That is, we
want our cognitive attitudes to accurately reflect our evidential situation. How-
ever, representing our evidence with perfect accuracy is not always required
for us to meet our practical and epistemic goals; often, a close approximation
will do. Since we have limited cognitive resources, sometimes it makes more
sense to rely on attitudes that are less than perfectly accurate to lighten our
cognitive load. This is supported by a popular psychological theory called the
‘adaptive toolbox’ model, on which the method we use for decision making
depends on the situation, and one of our primary goals is to pick a decision
tool that is maximally efficient but accurate enough for our circumstances.17
Following Weisberg (forthcoming: 9–10), I propose that belief and credence
are two cognitive tools that enable us to balance those goals.18
For many propositions, we have both a belief-attitude in p and a credal-
attitude in p. In reasoning, we can rely on either our belief-attitude or our
credal-attitude. The one we rely on depends on practical factors, and this
allows us to appropriately balance efficiency and accuracy in reasoning (Staffel
2017: 46). Here is how: when one relies on one’s belief that p, one rules out the
possibility of not-p. This makes reasoning about p much easier; one reasons
holding p fixed. In contrast to reasoning holding p fixed, there is a more
complex way to reason that takes more time and effort: reasoning considering
additional possibilities, e.g., both p and not-p. If one is agnostic about whether
p, and p is relevant to one’s reasoning, one will often reason treating both p
and not-p as live.19 In other cases, one may one believe p or believe not-p, but
expand the possibility space for other reasons. There is psychological evidence
that altering the possibility space under consideration in our reasoning is
particularly cognitively costly (Bettman, Johnson and Payne 1990: table 7). Yet
when the stakes are high, reasoning considering additional possibilities can be
appropriate and even obligatory.20
17 See Payne, Bettman & Johnson (1993), Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996), Gigerenzer, Todd &
ABC Research Group (1999), and Payne & Bettman (2004).
18 See Dallmann (2017) and Staffel (forthcoming) how beliefs simplify the way limited agents
update on new evidence.
19 Thanks to Lara Buchak. For cases where it is rational to rely on p in reasoning even if one
does not believe p, see Cohen (2000) and Locke (2015).
20 Although small changes in stakes may not prompt the move to credence reasoning, e.g. a
changing the prize of a bet from $10 to $20, the stakes need to be sufficiently high in order to
prompt a change in the space of possibilities. Thanks to Brian Kim. This raises another potential
worry: suppose the stakes are intermediate, such that it is not obvious whether we ought to rely on
our belief or our credence in reasoning. Deciding which to rely onmaymake our reasoningmore,
rather than less, complex. In reply, while reasoning about what to do often occurs occurrently
in the cases I consider, reasoning about how to reason does not; we often move from belief to
credence reasoning due to an automatic instinct, rather than an intentional process. Further,
in the intermediate case, it may not matter whether agents rely on their belief that p or their
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Consider an example, adapted from DeRose (2009), to illustrate how stakes
can change what possibilities one ought to consider. It may be completely
appropriate for me to believe my office mate, Rachel, is in the philosophy
building because I saw her coat and backpack in the office, and rely on
this belief if a friend casually asks me if Rachel is in today. However, if
police are investigating a murder in the philosophy department and require
a detailed list of everyone in the building that day, I ought to consider the
possibility that Rachel was not actually in that day, since I never actually
saw her, only her coat and backpack. It no longer seems appropriate to
treat the proposition Rachel was in the philosophy building today as given in my
reasoning.
Consider an analogy. When painting a wall, we use two kinds of brushes.
We use a big roller brush to efficiently paint the main flat surface of the wall,
where mistakes are not very costly. We use a small detail brush to paint the
corners, around the door, and other places where mistakes would be much
worse. If we painted the entire wall using the detail brush, we would be
very accurate but painfully inefficient. If we painted the entire wall using
the roller brush, we would be very efficient but, on some parts of the wall,
sloppy and inaccurate. We need both tools in order to paint both accurately
and efficiently. All else equal, it might be easier to use only one tool and
not be forced to switch back and forth. However, given the importance of
both efficiency and accuracy, switching back and forth between the two tools
is a much better policy than using a single tool to paint the entire wall.21
This analogy illustrates the way in which my view answers the Bayesian
Challenge for dualism—namely, the challenge that we do not need both
beliefs and credences to explain the rationality of action/inference/assertion
(see Frankish 2009; Kaplan 1996; Stalnaker 1984; Sturgeon 2008; Weisberg
forthcoming). According to the challenger, if beliefs make the same pre-
scriptions as credences, they are superfluous; if they make different ones,
we should trust those made by our credences. However, as the paintbrush
analogy suggests, beliefs are not superfluous to action/inference/assertion;
we need both beliefs and credences to strike an appropriate balance between
accuracy and efficiency in reasoning (which will, in turn, affect action and
assertion).
Note further that credence-firsters cannot explain the simplifying role
of belief in the same way. According to the credence-first view, belief just
credence, because, since the stakes are intermediate, the accuracy gain from using credence
reasoning may wash out whatever expected utility is gained by hedging one’s bets. Thus, the
instinct to move to credence reasoning may not kick in until the stakes are sufficiently high to
justify the switch (although this may depend on the agent, whether she is rational, etc.). Thanks
to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
21 Thanks to Blake Roeber and Jennifer Nagel.
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is a credence above some threshold. Even if an agent has a high enough
credence in p to justify acting as if p, in virtue of having a credence in p, they
are considering the possibilities of both p and not-p; both possibilities are live
for them.22 In this, they do not have an automatic or defeasible disposition to
treat p as true; rather, they must consider both p and not-p, and then judge
whether the stakes are such that they can rationally act as if p. This requires a
much more complex calculation than an agent who simply treats p as given in
her reasoning automatically and never considers the possibility of not-p (Ross
and Schroeder 2014: 270; Weisberg forthcoming: 11–16, 20–23). As Weisberg
notes, ‘Before an assumption can be made, its [credence] has to be compared
to some threshold, and the possibility that it’s false must then be discarded. . .
[but] these are exactly the kinds of extra computational operations an
adaptive decision maker is supposed to minimize’ (forthcoming: 10–12).
Further, altering the possibility space in question is one of the most expensive
tasks in terms of cognitive effort (Bettman, Johnson and Payne 1990). Thus, if
beliefs are merely high credences, it is hard to see how they could be their own
cognitive tool, or how they could enable us to reason more efficiently. Belief
cannot play the same simplifying role on a credence-first view that it does on a
dualist view.
One might wonder whether a belief-first view can maintain, like the dualist,
that beliefs simplify reasoning. For example, an agent might rely on her belief
that p when the stakes are low, but rely on her belief that the probability of p
is 0.9 when the stakes are high.23 In this paper, I take my main opponent to
be the more dominant credence-first view, and I officially remain agnostic as
to whether a belief-first view can employ the same purist explanation as the
dualist. However, even if a belief-firster can use beliefs with different contents
to mimic the dualist picture, it is nonetheless unclear how, on a belief-first view,
belief and credence are two different cognitive tools; there is a single attitude
whose content is varied, depending on the stakes. It is hard to see how a belief-
firster could aptly employ the paintbrush analogy discussed above, since there
are not two tools; there are just beliefs with different contents. At the very
least, whether a belief-first view can explain away pragmatic encroachment
requires further development, and this picture will look quite different than the
dualist one. I pursue the dualist response because I think it is a more plausible
picture of the mind, and because it can most clearly explain away pragmatic
encroachment.
22 Those that maintain that belief is credence 1 may be an exception. For example, Clarke
(2013), Greco (2015), and Dodd (2016) argue that belief is maximal credence; they may be able to
employ the simplifying role of belief.
23 Thanks to an anonymous referee.
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IV. HOW DUALISM EXPLAINS AWAY PRAGMATIC
ENCROACHMENT
IV.1. My view
Recall that, in the cases discussed in Section II, it seems epistemically rational
for Hannah to believe that the bank is open on Saturday in the first version of
the case, when there is very little at stake. In the second version of the case, there
is much more at stake, and it no longer seems like it is epistemically rational
for Hannah to believe the bank is open on Saturday. Call the proposition the
bank is open on Saturday p and Hannah’s epistemic situation E. Proponents of
pragmatic encroachment endorse the following theses:
(1) When the stakes are low, given E, it is rational for Hannah to believe that
p.
(2) When the stakes are high, given E, is it not rational for Hannah to believe
that p.
I submit that (1) and (2) do not accurately describe what is going on in
pragmatic encroachment cases. Instead, I propose the following:
(1∗) When the stakes are low, given E, it is rational for Hannah to both
believe p and rely on her belief that p, i.e. treat p as given in her
reasoning.
(2∗) When the stakes are high, given E, it is rational for Hannah to believe
that p, but it is not rational for Hannah to rely on her belief that p;
instead, Hannah ought to rely on her credence that p. Rather than
treating p as given, Hannah should consider both p and not-p in her
reasoning.
Note here that the phrase ‘rely on in reasoning’ is meant to apply to practical
reasoning (reasoning about what to do). There is a further question, namely,
can stakes affect whether it is rational to rely on a belief in theoretical reasoning
(reasoning about what to believe)? On this question, I remain agnostic.24
IV.2. Having a belief vs relying on it in reasoning
One question that immediately arises upon considering (1∗) and (2∗) is what
it means to have a belief but not rely on it in practical reasoning.25 On some
24 Thanks to Paul Blaschko. See Hawthorne & Stanley (2008: 577) for a view on which norms
for treating p as true apply equally to both practical and theoretical reasoning. Locke (2015: 77),
however, argues that how we ought to reason varies, depending on the kind of reasoning.
25 See Locke (2015) for a related view on which whether we ought to premise that p in practical
deliberation depends on practical factors.
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views of belief, if one does not treat p as given in reasoning, one does not
believe p. However, this is too quick. Of course, in many circumstances, there
is a correlation between belief that p and treating p as a given in reasoning.
But there are cases where one has a justified belief but ought not to rely on it,
due to sufficiently high stakes (Dallman 2014: 2307–8). Consider the following
cases from Jessica Brown and Baron Reed:
Birthplace: Liz is offered a bet on whether she was born in England. Liz
was in fact born there, and she has excellent reasons for believing this: her
parents told her, her family tells stories about visiting her in the hospital,
she has never had trouble with the government, etc. However, the payouts
of the bet are as follows: if Liz was born in England, she gains $10; if she
was not, she is tortured for the next 30 years. Liz decides not to take the bet
(Brown 2008a: 1144. See also Locke 2014: 39, 2015: 86–7).
Surgery: A student is shadowing a surgeon. In the morning, the surgeon
makes a decision to remove the left diseased kidney of a patient. Later,
right before the surgery, the student notices the surgeon consulting the
patient’s records. The student is puzzled, and asks a nurse why the surgeon
is doing this; the surgeon justifiedly believes—on excellent evidence—that
the kidney to be removed is the left one. The nurse assures the student that
the surgeon has not forgotten which kidney it is, but reminds the student
how bad it would be if the surgeon removed the wrong kidney. For this
reason, the surgeon checked the patient’s records before operating (Brown
2008b: 176).
Marriage: John rationally believes, on excellent evidence, that his friend’s
wife has been cheating on her husband. The husband confronts John be-
cause John has had this evidence for weeks; he is upset John did not tell him
sooner. John admits that he has believed this and had quite a bit of evidence
she was cheating for a while. However, he did not want to say anything until
he was absolutely sure she was cheating, because he knew the damage it
would cause to their marriage (Brown 2008b: 176–7).
Jellybean: Alex is participating in a psychological study that measures the
effect of stress onmemory. The researcher asks Alex questions about Roman
history, a subject that Alex knows quite a bit about. For every correct answer
Alex gives, he gets a jellybean; for every incorrect answer, Alex gets an
extremely painful electric shock. If Alex doesn’t answer a question, he gets
nothing. The researcher asks Alex the first question: when was Julius Caesar
born? Alex believes that the answer is 100 BC and is pretty confident, but
not absolutely certain. Because the reward of a jellybean is insignificant
and the electric shock is so painful, Alex decides not to answer the question
(Reed 2010: 228–9).
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In these cases, Liz, the surgeon, John, and Alex all have a justified belief in
the relevant proposition. Nonetheless, because of the stakes, they ought not to
rely on their beliefs in reasoning. They instead ought to rely on their credences.
Reliance on their credence, given the stakes, does not rationally allow them to
act on p, but this does not change the fact that they rationally believe p. We
can imagine the people in these cases saying something along the following
lines: ‘I believe it, but because things would be pretty bad if I were wrong, I
am not going to act on it.’
This distinction between having a belief and relying on it in reasoning helps
us make sense of the cases that are central in the pragmatic encroachment
debate, and see why they ultimately need not support pragmatism. We can
maintain that facts about whether one ought to believe p do not change unless
one’s epistemic situation changes; justifiedly having a belief is not sensitive to
stakes. However, stakes are one of the major factors that determine whether
one ought to rely on a belief in reasoning. Thus, pragmatism about rational
reliance on a belief is true.26
Part of what I am proposing is an error theory for our pragmatic encroach-
ment intuitions (cf. Hawthorne 2003: 211–26; Nagel 2008; Williamson 2005).
When we consider pragmatic encroachment cases, we have the intuition that
stakes can affect the rationality of a belief, but in this judgement, we are not
clearly distinguishing between justifiedly having a belief and justifiedly employing
a belief in reasoning. Consider the bank cases again. In the second version of the
case, suppose Hannah decides to wait in the long line even though she has the
memory of the bank’s being open tomorrow. Her friend Sarah asks ‘Why are
you waiting in line? The bank will be open tomorrow, so you can deposit the
check then when the lines are much shorter.’ As Roeber (2018a: 19) points out,
it would be reasonable for Hannah to reply, ‘I know. But I figure I should play
it safe and deposit the check now.’ Hannah need not give up her belief that the
bank is open tomorrow; continuing to believe this is not irrational. Rather, her
situation is such that she ought not to rely on this belief when deciding what
to do, given what is at stake.
One might worry that a satisfying error theory for pragmatic encroachment
cannot merely appeal to justified belief, but must apply to knowledge, as the
primary intuition aboutwhat is lost in high-stake cases concerns the latter.27 My
response is twofold. First, we do have the intuition that justified belief is lost in
high-stake cases; these intuitions are more clearly brought out when things are
worded less technically; instead of focusing on ‘epistemically justified belief ’,
merely focus on what high-stake agents should believe. Then, the intuition
is much clearer; for instance: ‘Hannah shouldn’t believe the bank is open
tomorrow. She could default on her loans!’ Further, this error theory can be
26 Alonso (2014: 163). Thanks to JJ Lang.
27 Thanks to an anonymous referee.
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extended to pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In the same way that,
in high-stake cases, Hannah should not rely on her belief that p in reasoning,
Hannah also should not rely on her knowledge that p in reasoning. Like
the belief case, our intuitions are not clearly distinguishing between knowing
something and relying on that knowledge. Further, the above cases (Birthplace,
Surgery,Marriage, and Jellybean) are all ones in which the agents can plausibly
be construed as knowing, but nonetheless ought not rely on their knowledge
that p in their reasoning. Thus, even if a belief amounts to knowledge, we may
not be justified to rely on it in reasoning. (I discuss this more in Section V.2
below.)
To clarify my proposal, it may be helpful to contrast it with other related,
recent literature. Ross and Schroeder (2014) also draw connections between
dualism and pragmatic encroachment.28 However, Ross and Schroeder con-
clude that pragmatic encroachment occurs. More specifically, their view is
that there is pragmatic encroachment on occurrent justified belief, but not on non-
occurrent justified belief. 29 In a low-stake context, one can occurrently believe
p; in a high-stake context, one may only retain one’s belief non-occurrently.30
In other words, Ross and Schroeder maintain that if S has a justified occurrent
belief that p, S ought to rely on p in her reasoning. However, I think it is clear
that we can have a justified occurrent belief that p, but nonetheless need not
rely on p in our reasoning.31 The cases above, Birthplace, Marriage, Surgery,
and Jellybean, are examples of this: cases where one rationally occurrently
believes p yet ought not rely on p in reasoning. In addition, I maintain a strict
purism about all justified belief: both occurrent and non-occurrent. Thus,
while we are responding to similar psychological facts, they draw the wrong
lessons from them.32
Another popular response to pragmatic encroachment cases involves the
idea that, in a high-stake context, subjects can justifiedly believe that p but are
not in a strong enough epistemic position to act on p (see e.g. Brown 2012;
Reed 2010, 2012; Rysiew 2007). I agree with these authors that having a justified
belief that p does not entail one ought to rely on that belief or act as if p is
true; above, I borrow their cases to establish this very point. My view fills out
theirs by painting a picture of the mind that can explain and add plausibility
to their insight.
One might wonder whether this insight—that in high-stakes cases, one
can believe p but cannot act on p—is consistent with a credence-first view.
28 For objections to Ross and Schroeder, see Locke (2014) and Tang (2015).
29 Thanks to Blake Roeber.
30 Ross & Schroeder (2014: 271). This follows from the principle they call ‘Justification Condi-
tion on Occurrent Attitudes’.
31 Locke (2014) raises a similar objection to Ross and Schroeder’s view.
32 Thanks to Blake Roeber and Lara Buchak.
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After all, maintaining that beliefs just are high credences seems consistent with
the idea that belief and action can come apart.33 In response, while I agree
these are strictly speaking consistent, it is hard to see why belief and action
would come apart in this way on the credence-first view. As I argued above,
credence-firsters cannot maintain the simplifying role of belief. If belief and
credence are equally complex—because belief is nothing over and above a
high credence—then it is hard to see why belief would be correlated with low
stakes and credence with high stakes, because there would not be any efficiency
payoff in relying on a belief when the stakes are low. So, a credence-firster can
pull apart belief and action, but the dualist can explain why belief and action
come apart: beliefs are relied on in low-stake cases and credences relied on in
high-stake cases, and the mental state one relies on in reasoning affects how
one ought to act.
IV.3. Psychological evidence
This explanation of pragmatic encroachment, (1∗) and (2∗), fits well with the
psychological literature. AsNagel (2008: 281) points out, multiple psychological
studies have shown (unsurprisingly) that, when asked to solve the same prob-
lem, high-stake subjects tend to try harder than their low-stake counterparts.
When the stakes are high, we think more systematically and less heuristically;
we move away from automatic reactions and first impressions and tend more
toward deliberate and controlled reasoning. Higher-stake subjects put forth
more cognitive effort and their cognitive biases were mitigated (Kunda 1990;
Lerner andTetlock 1999). If part of the role of belief is to simplify our reasoning
and mitigate cognitive effort, then it makes sense that we would tend to rely on
our beliefs when the stakes are lower. Credence-reasoning, on the other hand,
seems characteristic of the way psychologists describe high-stake reasoning: it
is deliberate, controlled, and requiring more cognitive work.
Other psychologists, such as Kahneman (2013), have proposed a model
called the ‘two-system’ or ‘dual-process’ view. This model also suggests that
what kind of reasoning in which we engage depends on what is at stake. On
Kahneman’s picture, for example, we have two systems, System 1 and System
2. System 1 is ‘fast thinking’, which is lazy but efficient, and is our automatic,
default mode of reasoning. System 2 is ‘slow thinking’ and requires much
more mental work, attention, and effort, but is also more precise and reliable.
Kahneman argues that the two-system theory can explain many psychologi-
cal tendencies and heuristics, such as the availability heuristic, the base rate
fallacy, how difficult it is for us to reason with small probabilities, and much
33 Thanks to an anonymous referee.
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more.34 Participants in many of Kahneman’s studies were more likely to rely
on System 2 when the stakes were higher, e.g. they were given money or a
desirable reward for getting a problem correct.35 In some cases, belief-
reasoning looks a lot like System 1 reasoning, as both are efficient and gen-
erally our default way of reasoning and thinking about the world (see Carter,
Jarvis and Rubin 2016: 2338). However, credence-reasoning—especially pre-
cise, careful credence reasoning—looks much more like System 2 reasoning,
as it is more costly and less efficient, but can enable to us avoid errors. I do
not commit to the idea that belief-reasoning is always System 1 reasoning, nor
that credence reasoning is always System 2 reasoning (because, for example,
sloppy or simplified credence reasoning may resemble certain types of System
1 reasoning). However, the two-system/dual-process models further support
the idea stakes affect reasoning, and whether we rely on a belief or a credence
depends on what is at stake.36
Further, there is a psychological phenomenon called ‘need-for-closure’, and
this describes how quickly subjects come to settle a question after opening
inquiry on somematter.High need-for-closure is associatedwith quick decision
making, low stakes, and/or the need to settle some question as soon as possible.
Subjects with low need-for-closure, on the other hand, leave questions open
for longer and take their time making up their mind. Psychological studies
have shown that one major factor that diminishes our need for closure is
higher stakes; we will take longer to think through an answer if it is especially
important we get it right, e.g. because there is a reward involved (Kruglanski
and Freund 1983; Kruglanski and Webster 1991, 1996). Further, as Weisberg
(forthcoming) suggests, it is plausible that closure often involves the decision
to form or rely on a belief; this also fits well with Jane Friedman’s account
of belief (2011). If this is right, then belief-reasoning is correlated with high
need-for-closure (the desire to make up one’s mind quickly) and low stakes,
and credence-reasoning is correlated with low need-for-closure (the desire to
take one’s time and think through some matter) and high stakes.37 Thus, we
tend to settle on or rely on a belief when there are high benefits and low cost
for closure. Credences, on the other hand, come up when it is costly to close
inquiry because, for example, there is a significant risk involved.38
34 Kahneman (2013: ch. 1, 13, 14, and 16). See also Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982). For a
more recent defence of dual process theory, see Evans & Stanovich (2013a,b). Thanks to Jennifer
Nagel.
35 Kunda (1990) and Lerner & Tetlock (1999). See also Nagel (2008, 2010a,b).
36 Further psychological evidence for dualism is nicely summarized byWeisberg (forthcoming)
and includes Webster & Kruglanski (1994, Kruglanski & Webster 1996). See also Nagel (2008,
2010a,b).
37 See Nagel (2008) for a view that uses psychological evidence and specifically cognitive
closure to explain what is going on in pragmatic encroachment cases.
38 Thanks to Lara Buchak.
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The following chart summarizes the basics of my view:
Having the attitude Relying on the attitude in
reasoning
Belief that p Rationality purely a function of
one’s epistemic situation
Rationality a function of one’s
epistemic and practical situation
Has the property of stability: does
not change in virtue of an
evidentially irrelevant change in
credences/preferences (Ross and
Schroeder 2014: 277)
 Entails treating p as given/
accepting p (in most cases)
Correlated with high
need-for-closure and System 1
reasoning
Credence that p Rationality purely a function of
one’s epistemic situation
Rationality a function of one’s
epistemic and practical situation
When occurrent, rational credence
fluctuates to mirror one’s epistemic
situation (e.g. as our degree of
justification or evidence changes)
 Entails considering both p and
not-p
Correlated with low need-for-
closure and System 2 reasoning
V. OBJECTIONS
V.1. What is belief ?
Onemight wonder what it is for one to believe p, if it is possible to have a belief
but not rely on it in reasoning. If the belief is not influencing one’s reasoning,
in what meaningful sense does one even have the belief anymore?
First, the idea that it is possible to have a belief but not rely on it in reasoning
is consistent with most of the major theories of belief: dispositionalism, rep-
resentationalism, functionalism, and primitivism.39 For example, as William
Alston notes, having a belief might be associated with a set of defeasible dis-
positions, e.g. if S believes p, then. . .
• if someone asks S whether p, S will tend to respond in the affirmative.
• if S considers whether p, S will tend to feel it to be the case that p.
• S will tend to believe propositions that S takes to follow from p.
• if S learns not-p, S will tend to be surprised (Alston 1996: 4).
All of these characteristics of belief are consistent with my view. Not only
does my view fit with many versions of dispositionalism about belief, but it
is also consistent with representationalism about belief: one believes p iff one
represents the world’s being such that p. It is merely that, if the stakes become
high enough, one ought to be willing to take into consideration the possibility
of error. One represents the world’s being such that p, but not with probability
39 For an overview of the different theories of belief, see Schwitgebel (2015).
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1. My view fits with functionalism about belief as well. Finally, it might be that
belief is a primitive concept; ‘belief ’ is a familiar part of our everyday discourse
and my view is consistent with treating it as a primitive.
Second, in what meaningful sense do we retain beliefs if we do not utilize
them in reasoning? First, one may have a belief non-occurrently and thus not
refer to it in reasoning. One has not given up the belief; it is stored in one’s
mind, but one is occurrently reasoning with one’s credence. When we say
things like ‘there’s a good chance that p, but I’m not totally confident; it might
be that not-p’, we are engaging in credence reasoning. This kind of reasoning
is consistent with one’s believing that p; one is just not relying on one’s belief
in this instance of reasoning.
Further, it even seems possible to even have a belief occurrently but not utilize
it in reasoning; this is what is happening in many of the above cases (i.e.
Birthplace, Surgery, Marriage, Jellybean). For example, Alex could reason as
follows: ‘I believe Julius Caesar was born in 100BC; I have excellent evidence to
support this and see no reason to give up this belief. Nonetheless, I don’t think
I should answer the question. There’s a very small chance that I’m wrong, and
the risk of the extremely painful shock simply is not worth the potential gain
of a jellybean.’ Alex occurrently believes Julius Caesar was born in 100 BC,
but also recognizes that he should not rely on his belief in this circumstance.
One might object that expressions of the form ‘I believe p but maybe not-p,
so I should hedge my bets’ should not necessarily be taken indicators of one’s
believing p, but are simply expressions of high credence. If one truly believed p,
they would simply assert p; asserting ‘I believe p’ is rather a way of hedging with
respect to p.40 In response, ceteris paribus, we should take people’s claims about
their own mental states at face value. Of course, we cannot rule out that these
statements of belief express high credences, but I think an account that takes
the statements literally should be preferred to one that does not. Further, onmy
account, an assertion that p is generally correlated not merely with believing
p, but with something stronger: a reliance on one’s belief in reasoning. Thus,
statements like ‘p, but maybe not p’ or ‘p, but there’s a chance I’m wrong’,
sound odd, because the first conjunct indicates a reliance on one’s belief that
p, and the second indicates a reliance on one’s credence in p, and as Staffel
(2017) argues, we do not rely on both attitudes at the same time. So, while most
cases of assertion that p indicate belief that p, having a belief that p, even if
occurrent, may not always license a flat-out assertion that p.
This raises the question: What does it mean to occurrently believe p, if it
is possible to occurrently believe p without relying on p in one’s reasoning?41
On my view, when agents occurrently believe p at time t, they recognize the
fact that they believe p at t; the proposition is at the forefront of their mind
40 Thanks to an anonymous referee.
41 Thanks to an anonymous referee.
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and they are immediately aware of the fact that they believe it. However, that
does not entail that they will or ought to rely on p in their reasoning; one can
be considering p, acknowledging that they believe p, but nonetheless rely on
their credence in p in reasoning about what to do. Further, the various theories
of belief, e.g. functionalism, do not commit us to any particular view of what
occurrent beliefs are like, and thus my view of belief need not rule them out.42
On my view, then, we can distinguish the following four states/acts:
• Believing p (can be non-occurrent).
• Occurrently believing p, i.e. p is at the forefront of your mind, and you
recognize that you believe it.
•Relying on p in reasoning, i.e. treating p as a premise in practical reasoning.
• Acting as if p (which may come apart from reliance in, e.g. weakness of
will cases).43
It is crucially important to keep these four distinct, and note that, contra
many defenders of pragmatic encroachment, there are several steps between
believing p and acting as if p is true.
V.2. What about principle-based arguments for pragmatic encroachment?
A second objection involves the extent to which my view supports purism.
There are two main ways proponents of pragmatic encroachment have mo-
tivated their view: via cases and via principles (Roeber 2018a). While I have
argued that the typical pragmatist argument from cases is based on a failure
to recognize a crucial distinction, I have not discussed the principle-based
arguments for pragmatic encroachment.
I first want to note that I am satisfied if I have merely diffused the case-
based arguments for pragmatic encroachment. I acknowledge that there are
many principle-based arguments to which I may not have responded. At the
same time, my arguments challenge some of the principle-based arguments
for pragmatic encroachment. Consider the following principle:
JB-action principle: If S has a justified belief that p, it is rational for S to
act as if p.
If my argument above succeeds, then the JB-action principle is false; Birth-
place, Surgery, Marriage, and Jellybean are all counterexamples to it. Thus,
I have provided a reason to question any principle-based argument for prag-
matic encroachment that relies on the JB-action principle. However, recall at
the beginning of the paper that I shifted focus to justified belief, but knowledge
has traditionally been the subject of the pragmatic encroachment debate. A
42 Thanks to Callie Phillips.
43 Thanks to Kate Finley.
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more widely discussed principle used to motivate pragmatic encroachment is
the following:
Knowledge-action principle: If S knows that p, it is rational for S to act
as if p.44
I have not directly given arguments against theKnowledge-action principle.
However, there are at least two ways that my arguments count against it. First,
it is unclear why knowledge, but not justified belief, would allow one to act as
if p. What component of knowledge would pave the way to rational action,
apart from justification and/or belief ? It is hard to see how the Knowledge-
action principle could be true if the JB-action principle is false (Kim 2017: 2;
Locke 2015: 83). Second, many of the cases I use to challenge the JB-action
principle can also be used against the Knowledge-action principle. In cases
very similar to Birthplace, Surgery, Marriage, and Jellybean, the agents know
p but are in a practical situation such that they ought not to act on p. Thus,
my arguments above can be extended to challenge principles often used to
motivate pragmatic encroachment.
There are many other principles besides the two above the proponents
of pragmatic encroachment have used in arguments for pragmatism; Roeber
(2018a) discusses at least five others. While I do not have space to consider
each of these in detail, I note the following general observation. Almost all
of the principles draw a close connection between belief/epistemic justifica-
tion/knowledge and action: e.g. actions one can/is willing to/ought to per-
form. However, presupposing a tight connection between the epistemic and
the practical from the beginning and using this connection to argue for prag-
matic encroachment seems somewhat dialectically inappropriate. The tight
connection between the practical and the epistemic is the very connection
that many purists deny. In sum, while I do not take myself to have success-
fully diffused all the principle-based arguments for pragmatism, my arguments
provide a reason to be sceptical of many of them.45
44 The Knowledge-action principle was originally proposed by Fantl & McGrath (2002).
Proponents of it include Hawthorne (2003), Hawthorne & Stanley (2008), Fantl & McGrath
(2009), and Ross & Schroeder (2014). For arguments against the Knowledge-action principle,
see Brown (2008a,b, 2012), DeRose (2009), Lackey (2010), Reed (2010), Neta (2012), and Roeber
(2018a).
45 One might worry that my view has especially unhappy consequences when it comes to
moral encroachment, the view that epistemically justified belief depends on moral factors. If you
have a lot of (misleading) evidence for a sexist or racist belief, it might seem like my view would
entail you ought to continue to have that belief, despite the high stakes, but you ought not rely
on it in reasoning. In response, I agree that an immoral belief is problematic, but not necessarily
epistemically problematic—rather, it is morally and all-things-considered problematic, and from
those perspectives, you ought not hold it. Thanks to Jason Stanley, Amy Flowerree, and Chris
Copan for helpful discussion. For more on moral encroachment, see Pace (2011), Fritz (2017),
Gardiner (2018), Moss (2018), Basu & Schroeder (2019), and Basu (forthcoming).
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VI. CONCLUSION
I conclude that belief-credence dualism can offer a unique explanation for
pragmatic encroachment. I explained a dualist picture of the mind on which
belief and credence are two cognitive tools that enable us to balance efficiency
and accuracy. Then, I argued that there is a crucial distinction between having
a belief and relying on a belief in reasoning. Once this distinction is salient,
one can see that high stakes do not require agents to give up their beliefs;
instead, high stakes make it such that agents ought to rely on their credences
instead of their beliefs. Thus, we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic
encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate
it; belief-credence dualism can explain these cases, vindicating purism.46
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